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Keith Ansell-Pearson
16 When Wisdom Assumes Bodily Form
There are not many of them, of these non-apologetic, truly non-religious philosophers in the his-
tory of philosophy: among the great philosophers, I can see only Epicurus, Spinoza (who is ad-
mirable), Marx, when he is properly understood, and Nietzsche. (L. Althusser, Philosophy of the
Encounter)
Epicurus has been alive in all ages and lives now, unknown to those who have called and
call themselves Epicureans, and enjoying no reputation among philosophers. He has, moreover,
himself forgotten his own name: it was the heaviest burden he ever cast off. (F. Nietzsche, The
Wanderer and his Shadow 227)
Epicurean doctrine has been greatly maligned and misunderstood in the history of
thought.¹ One commentator on Epicurus’s philosophy speaks of the ‘slanders and
fallacies of a long and unfriendly tradition’ and invites us to reflect on Epicurus as
at one and the same time the most revered and most reviled of all founders of phi-
losophy in the Greco-Roman world (DeWitt 1954: 3). Since the time of the negative
assessment by Cicero and the early Church Fathers, ‘Epicureanism has been used
as a smear word—a rather general label indicating atheism, selfishness, and de-
bauchery’ (Leddy and Lifschitz 2009: 4). It is the tradition of modern materialism
in philosophy that is responsible for revivifying Epicurean teaching, including nota-
ble figures such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Diderot, and La Mettrie amongst others. Al-
though rarely noted in the literature on Epicureanism, significant receptions of Epi-
curean philosophy take place in nineteenth century European thought. For Marx,
writing in the 1840s, and in defiance of Hegel’s negative assessment, Epicurus is
the ‘greatest representative of the Greek enlightenment’ (Marx 1975: 73), whilst for
Jean-Marie Guyau, writing in the 1870s, Epicurus is the original free spirit, ‘Still
today it is the spirit of old Epicurus who, combined with new doctrines, works
away at and undermines Christianity’ (Guyau 1878 : 280). For Nietzsche, Epicurus
is one of the greatest human beings to have graced the earth and the inventor of
‘heroic-idyllic philosophizing’ (WS 295). Epicurus, along with the Stoic Epictetus,
is to be revered as a thinker in whom wisdom assumes bodily form. The point is per-
haps obvious: philosophy is not simply sophistry or mere paideia but an incorporat-
ed wisdom that enables the individual to negotiate and affirm the most demanding
and challenging questions of existence, including, and notably including, the tests of
the self, such as the fact of our mortality and how to live. Pierre Hadot has written
instructively about the claims of wisdom and philosophy as a way of life. He echoes
Nietzsche’s concerns when he writes: ‘Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an
art of living. By contrast, modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of
a technical jargon reserved for specialists’ (Hadot 1995: 272). As he notes, wisdom
does not cause us to know but rather makes us be in a different way (1995: 265).
 Some of the material on Nietzsche in this essay was first presented in Ansell-Pearson (2013).
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As a mode of being in the world and a way of life such wisdom brings a serene mind
(ataraxia), inner freedom (autarkeia), and what he calls a ‘cosmic consciousness’.²
Nietzsche will re-work all three ideas in his middle period, especially the first two.
There are some striking similarities in the reception and appropriation of Epicu-
rus we find in both Marx and Nietzsche. Ultimately, however, the two diverge in their
appropriations, with Marx locating in the teaching of Epicurus an abstract individu-
alism and a contemplative materialism, whilst Nietzsche in his middle period writ-
ings prizes Epicurus for his teaching on a refined egoism and advocating social with-
drawal. In what follows I shall attempt to illuminate these similarities and points of
divergence. I shall begin first with Marx and illuminate some salient features of his
interpretation of Epicurus; then I shall turn my attention to Nietzsche and highlight
the character of his appropriation of Epicurus.
16.1 Marx on Epicurus
According to Michael Inwood, Marx’s aim in his doctoral dissertation of 1841 was to
‘redress Hegel’s injustice to Epicurus’ (Inwood 1992: 262). For Hegel, Epicurus does
not make an original contribution to philosophy with his philosophy of physics
held to be essentially that of Leucippus and Democritus. Hegel’s reflections on the
loss of key manuscripts of Epicurus are highly telling:
The number of his writings is said to have amounted to three hundred; it is scarcely to be regret-
ted that they are lost to us.We may rather thank Heaven that they no longer exist; philologists at
any rate would have had great trouble with them. (Hegel 1995: 280)
In spite of this negative assessment, Hegel does recognise the importance of Epicu-
rus as an ethical teacher, finding his ethics the most interesting part of his system
and the best part of his philosophy. In Epicurus’s practical philosophy we find, as
we do in the Stoics, ‘the individuality of self-consciousness’ with the end or telos
of his ethics being one of psychic tranquillity and undisturbed pure enjoyment of it-
self. In Epicureanism, as in Stoicism, we find individuality as ethical principle but
also a universality of thinking. Hegel concurs with the Epicurean teaching on con-
quering the fear of death and the fear of the future. He correctly notes the modesty
of an Epicurean existence:
The principle of Epicurus is to live in freedom and ease, and with the mind at rest, and to this
end it is needful to renounce much of that which men allow to sway them, and in which they
find their pleasure. The life of a Stoic is therefore but little different from that of an Epicurean
who keeps well before his eyes what Epicurus enjoins. (Hegel 1995: 303)
 On this ‘cosmic consciousness’ see Hadot (1995), especially p. 273.
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Simple dishes afford as much enjoyment as costly banquet, should they appease
hunger, and this clearly indicates that in making pleasure our aim it is not the enjoy-
ments of the gourmand we need to have in mind, but rather freedom from both pain
of body and uneasiness of mind. In spite of the individuality and universality af-
firmed by Epicurean and Stoic philosophies, for Hegel the two systems of thought
are ultimately opponents. However, both systems are one-sided and it is the Notion
that can explain this and go beyond it, ‘abrogating fixed extremes of determination
such as these, [it] moves them and sets from free from a mere state of opposition’
(Hegel 1995: 310). Marx does not depart from aspects of this ultimate assessment
of Epicurus, but he does radically differ from Hegel in his overall appreciation of
him.
The opening lines of the dissertation show the extent to which Marx is challeng-
ing received wisdom about ancient philosophy, namely, that it culminates and in fact
ends with Aristotle. As Marx points out, the Hellenistics are often seen as tenden-
tious and one-sided eclectics, with Epicureanism taken to be a syncretic combination
of Democritus’s physics with an ethics derived from the Cynics, and Stoicism as a
compound of physics of Heraclitus, a cynical-ethical view of the world, and some
logic derived from Aristotle. Like Nietzsche after him, Marx will challenge received
conceptions of the history of philosophy and how it is to be narrated. In particular
both will identify what Marx calls ‘the setting of the sun’ and Nietzsche ‘the dawn’
in novel and fertile ways. Marx asks a series of fresh and novel questions, noting
how the Roman philosophies attempt a synthesis of the pre-Socratic philosophy of
nature with regard to physics and the school of Socrates with regard to ethics. All
the schools are united in their belief that the aim of philosophy is to produce the
wise man (the sophos), and this man is also the free human being.
Marx divides his dissertation into two main parts, first looking into the difference
between the Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of nature in general and then,
secondly, in detail. He adds an appendix in which he subjects to critique Plutarch’s
polemic against the theology of Epicurus. Marx begins his dissertation by question-
ing the wisdom of the view that Greek philosophy came to an end with Aristotle and
with the later schools, such as the Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics, to be treated ‘as
an almost improper addition bearing no relation to its powerful premises’ (Marx
1975: 34). He notes in particular how these different schools are often portrayed as
being one-sided and made up of tendentious eclecticism. Marx is keen to contest
this reception and to revalue their relation to the older Greek philosophy. His
focus is on the relation between the Epicurean and Democritean philosophy of na-
ture and his principal aim is to contest the dominant reception of this relationship
in which the physics of the two systems of thought have long been identified. One
example given is the reading of Cicero who contends that most of the physics of Ep-
icurus is already to be found in Democritus and where he adds to it he only worsens
it. A similar negative appraisal can be found in Plutarch. Marx goes on to note the
assessment of the Church Fathers, including Clement of Alexandria and who reinter-
prets the warning of Paul against philosophy in general into a warning against Epi-
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curean philosophy in particular. If we turn our attention to the moderns we find a
similar negative assessment of Epicurus, with Leibniz for example noting that
what we know of Democritus is what we find borrowed from him in Epicurus and
that this is unreliable since he did not always take what is the best. The consensus,
then, as Marx reads the literature, is that Epicurus largely borrowed his physics from
Democritus and that he is not a thinker who made significant innovations to the doc-
trine of atomism.
Marx now turn his attention to complicating the received picture of the relation
between the two systems, noting that although the ‘principles’—notably atoms and
the void—are the same, ‘they stand diametrically opposed in all that concerns
truth, certainty, application of this science, and all that refers to the relationship be-
tween thought and reality in general’ (Marx 1975: 38). In fact, Marx sees the two phi-
losophers opposed at every step. Democritus is a sceptic about sense perception and
our knowledge of an independent external world, and Epicurus by contrast is a ‘dog-
matist’. Where Democritus is only able to see the sensuous world as subjective sem-
blance, Epicurus is able to conceive it as objective appearance. Marx elaborates fur-
ther:
He who considers the sensuous world as subjective semblance applies himself to empirical nat-
ural science and to positive knowledge, and represents the unrest of observation, experimenting,
learning everywhere, ranging over the wide, wide world. The other, who considers the phenom-
enal world to be real, scorns empiricism; embodied in him are the serenity of thought satisfied in
itself, the self-sufficiency that draws its knowledge ex principio interno (from an inner principle).
(Marx 1975: 45)
Whereas the sceptic considers existence and the world from the perspective of neces-
sity, the dogmatist, places the emphasis on chance, with each one of them rejecting
the opposing view with ‘polemical irritation’ (Marx 1975: 43). We do not need to fol-
low the details of Marx’s interpretation here. The main point to note is that he is
drawing attention to what we might call the ‘ethical imperative’ of Epicurean doc-
trine, in which physics is subordinated to ethics:
All that matters is the tranquillity of the explaining subject. Since everything possible is admit-
ted as possible, which corresponds to the character of abstract possibility, the chance of being is
clearly transferred only into the chance of thought. The only rule which Epicurus prescribes,
namely, that ‘the explanation should not contradict sensation’, is self-evident; for to be abstract-
ly possible consists precisely in being free from contradiction, which must therefore be avoided.
(Marx 1975: 45)
As Marx goes on to note from this insight, the method of explanation sought by Epi-
curus aims at the ataraxia of consciousness, and ‘not at knowledge of nature in and
for itself ’ (Marx 1975: 45). And as one commentator explains, by chance here Marx
means not so much pure chance, and as results from the throwing of dice, but rather
the argument that recognises that the history of the universe is a contingent one and
not one guided by design or providence (see Foster 2000: 45).
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Why does Marx turn to Epicurus at this point in his intellectual development?
According to John Bellamy Foster, Marx is interested in the relation of Epicureanism
to the Enlightenment, evident not only in his doctoral dissertation but in his ‘Note-
books on Epicurean Philosophy’ of 1839 (compiled whilst he was working on the dis-
sertation) and subsequent writings such as The Holy Family (1845) and The German
Ideology (1846).What Marx sees in Epicurus is an important moment in the unfolding
of a philosophy of freedom, in which the human being frees itself from the bonds of
fear and superstition and ‘becomes capable of forging his own happiness’ (Rubel and
Manale 1975: 16–17, cited in Foster 2000: 33). In Epicurean doctrine ‘Individual will is
asserted; an understanding of contingency becomes central to the wisdom of life’
(Rubel and Manale 1975: 16– 17). A materialist ethics has its basis in the insights
into mortality and finitude, in which the conquest of the fear of death promoted
by established religion and superstition becomes paramount. Freedom begins only
‘when it was possible to ascertain by means of “natural science” the mortality of
the soul and the individuals within it’ (Foster 2000: 36). Although, Epicurus advocat-
ed a ‘contemplative materialism’ this has to be seen in the context in which he was
writing and operating, namely, the aftermath of the hegemony of Macedonia during
which time the successors of Alexander fought it out over his empire, and so making
political activity at this time seem highly ineffective (Foster 2000: 34). However, in
spite of the contemplative aspects Marx was able to perceive in the doctrine radical,
practical implications. In his reinterpretation of Epicurus, Marx contests the criticism
we encounter in Francis Bacon (and whom Marx starts to read in the 1830s), which
argues that Epicurus is an inferior philosopher to Democritus on account of his sub-
ordination of natural to moral philosophy. Marx, however, locates in this subordina-
tion a philosophy that places the emphasis on the primacy of practical freedom.
Marx turns the perceived weakness of the Epicurean doctrine into its great strength
and when compared with the Democritean philosophy and its explanation of all
things in terms of an iron-clad necessity: ‘Like Bacon in The Wisdom of the Ancients,
Marx coupled the image of Prometheus in his dissertation with the Greek atomists,
though in Marx’s case it was Epicurus rather than Democritus who was to be Prom-
etheus’ ancient counterpart’ (Foster 2000: 52).³
Epicurus is a thinker of evolution and for him freedom is something that evolves.
This is his great significance for Marx. Although his thinking may have eccentric as-
pects, such as the doctrine of the swerve or the declination of the atom from the
straight line, he succeeds in liberating philosophy from doctrines of determinism
and necessitarianism. As Foster neatly puts it:
What fascinated Marx was the fact that Epicurean philosophy ‘swerves away’ from all restrictive
modes of being, just as the gods in Epicurean philosophy swerve away from the world—a world
of freedom and self-determination over which they hold no sway. In Epicurus ‘the law of the
 For a recent attempt to read Epicurus in the light of his Democritean background, and focused on
ethics, see Warren (2002).
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atom’ is ‘repulsion’, the collision of elements; it no longer needs fixation in any form. (Foster
2000: 55)
For Marx, the essential insight here is contained in Lucretius when he notes that the
swerve or declination breaks the fati foedera or the bonds of fate (Marx 1975: 49).
Nietzsche too, we may note, comes to appreciate Epicureanism as a liberating doc-
trine on the importance played by the role of chance in both human affairs and
the history of the universe (see D 13, D 33, and D 36). As Pierre Hadot notes, for
the Epicurean sage the world is the product of chance, not divine intervention,
and this brings with it pleasure and peace of mind, freeing him from an unreason-
able fear of the gods and allowing him to consider each moment as an unexpected
miracle. Each moment of existence can be greeted with immense gratitude (Hadot
1995: 252). So, whereas for Democritus the world is characterised by necessity, in Ep-
icurean doctrine the emphasis is placed on chance, contingency, and the evolution of
freedom. For Marx, Epicurus places the emphasis on a doctrine of freedom that
knows no final constraints; his importance is that he frees philosophy both from de-
terminism and from the teleological principles of religion (Foster 2000: 56). Of
course, Epicurus does not deny necessity completely, since this would mean that ev-
erything could come from anything; rather, his aim is to affirm the possibility of free-
dom that breaks with the bounds of such necessity (2000: 56).
For Marx, Epicureanism shows that sensuousness is a temporal process, indeed,
that human sensuousness is what he calls ‘embodied time’ in which our perception
through the senses is only possible because we are active beings in the world and in
relation to nature (Marx 1975: 64). The human being is the site of the disclosure of
nature: ‘In hearing nature hears itself, in smelling it smells itself, in seeing it sees
itself ’ (1975: 65). At the same time we also experience nature and life as the passing
away of all things: the senses are activated by external stimuli that are transitory.
This means for Marx that the pure form of the world of appearance is time, and
it’s on the basis of such an insight that it’s possible to credit Epicurus with being
the first philosopher to truly grasp appearance as appearance, namely the ‘alienation
of the essence, activating itself in reality as such an alienation’ (1975: 65).
This is a significant move to make and of great importance for our appreciation
of the history of philosophy and the events that inform it, such as the Epicurean mo-
ment. Typically we associate materialism with a mechanical determinism and that
places human beings in a passive relation to nature and the world.We then identify
idealism with the counter-doctrine that places the emphasis on our active constitu-
tion of nature and the world. Epicureanism is a strict materialism but it is one, on
Marx’s interpretation, that clearly sees the active dimension of human existence,
in which sensation is related to change and passing away, in short, to finitude. As
Foster writes:
Already there is an understanding of the existence of alienated self-consciousness, and of
knowledge involving both sensation and intellectual abstraction (a complex relation that
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Marx was to refer to in his notes as ‘the dialectic of sensuous certitude’). Moreover, in Epicurus is
found even the view that our consciousness of the world (for example, our language) develops in
relation to the evolution of the material conditions governing subsistence. (Foster 2000: 55)
This explains why Marx is able to say that in spite of its contradictions the philoso-
phy of atomism reaches an apogee with Epicurus in which it is completed as ‘the nat-
ural science of self-consciousness’. In Epicurus, then, human beings are no longer de-
picted as being either the products of simple nature or of supernatural forces; rather
than relating to a different form of existence they relate to each other, and so instead
of providing an ‘ordinary logic’, as Hegel claimed, Epicurus provides this dialectic of
self-consciousness, albeit in a contemplative mode. Epicurus is the great teacher for
both Marx and Nietzsche of liberation from fear, especially the inner fear that is so
hard to extinguish, and in which the human being finds itself incapable of self-de-
termination. This, for Marx, is the greatest sin of religion: to hold back the human
being from its freedom, or at least its potentiality for freedom. In this respect Epicur-
eanism is a deeply subversive, and radically atheistic, philosophy, one that Christian-
ity despises and seeks to combat. In The German Ideology Marx and Engels will
praise Epicurus for overthrowing the gods and trampling religion underfoot.
Let me draw this section on Marx to a close by noting a key point: for Marx, De-
mocritus and Epicurus represent two different intellectual types. Democritus is in
search of knowledge and is an encyclopaedic seeker; by contrast, Epicurus is ‘satis-
fied and blissful in philosophy’ (Marx 1975: 41). Marx cites Epicurus when he suggests
that to serve philosophy is freedom itself. The study of philosophy is not something
to be delayed and it is never too early or too late to undertake this study. Democritus
is prepared to sacrifice philosophy for the positive sciences modelled on an ideal,
and idealised, conception of empirical knowledge. Epicurus, by contrast, has con-
tempt for the positive sciences and is essentially self-taught. And, furthermore,whilst
Democritus travels the corners of the world in search of this encyclopaedic knowl-
edge, Epicurus leaves his garden rarely. The rumour is that Democritus blinds himself
at the end of his life on account of feeling despair over the acquisition of knowledge,
whilst Epicurus,who felt the hour of death approaching, took a warm bath, called for
some wine, and advised his friends to remain faithful to philosophy. Philosophy, for
Epicurus, is not paideia but an ethopoiesis in which wisdom assumes bodily form.
16.2 Nietzsche on Epicurus
In a note from 1872–73 Nietzsche describes Democritus as ‘the freest human being’
(NL 1872–73, KSA 7, 23[17]). Nietzsche had been preoccupied with him in the 1860s,
especially the period 1866–68, in his so-called ‘Democritea’ project where his main
concern was with establishing the authenticity of his corpus. As James Porter notes,
the story of his involvement with Democritus has been a matter of near total neglect
and yet the encounter is of major importance since, in Porter’s words, ‘Nietzsche
16 When Wisdom Assumes Bodily Form 315
Authenticated | k.j.ansell-pearson@warwick.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 9/25/18 8:55 AM
trades heavily on the critical potentials of atomism’ (Porter 2000: 23). According to
Porter, a recuperation of Democritean doctrine from the fragments means inevitably
recuperating some of its critical and subversive force—Plato is completely silent on
Democritus and atomism,which is an omission noted in antiquity. However, the mid-
dle period Nietzsche shows little interest in the innovations of Epicurus’s atomism
and focuses his attention largely on how Epicurus represents a new ethical awaken-
ing.⁴ For Nietzsche, Epicurus’s teaching can show us how to quieten our being and
so help to temper a human mind that is prone to neurosis. Nietzsche confesses to
having dwelled like Odysseus in the underworld and says that he will often be
found there again. As a ‘sacrificer’ who sacrifices so as to talk to the dead he states
that there are four pairs of thinkers from whom he will accept judgement, and Epi-
curus and Montaigne make up the first pair he mentions (AOM 408).⁵ Epicurus, along
with the Stoic Epictetus, is revered as a thinker in whom wisdom assumes bodily
form (HH II 224). Nietzsche admits at this time to being inspired by the example
of Epicurus whom he calls one of the greatest human beings to have ever graced
the earth and the inventor of a ‘heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing’ (WS 295). It
is heroic because conquering the fear of death is involved and the human being
has the potential to walk on the earth as a god, living a blessed life, and idyllic be-
cause Epicurus philosophised, calmly and serenely, and away from the crowd, in a
garden. In Human, all too Human Nietzsche writes of a ‘refined heroism’ ‘which dis-
dains to offer itself to the veneration of the great masses … and goes silently through
the world and out of the world’ (HH I 291). This is deeply Epicurean in inspiration:
Epicurus taught that one should die as if one had never lived. There is a modesty
of human existence in Epicurean teaching that greatly appeals to the middle period
Nietzsche.
In his late writings, such as The Anti-Christian, Epicurus is depicted by Nietzsche
as a decadent, indeed, a ‘typical’ decadent (A 30),⁶ and in one note Nietzsche in-
forms his readers that he has presented such terrible images of knowledge to human-
ity that any Epicurean delight is out of the question and only Dionysian joy is suffi-
cient: he has been the first to discover the tragic. In the neglected middle period
texts, however, the picture is quite different with Nietzsche drawing heavily, if selec-
tively, on the example of Epicurus and core aspects of Epicurean teaching. The ques-
tion is: for what ends and for what ultimate purpose does he do this in these texts?
To answer this question we need to understand further something of the set of con-
 It should perhaps be noted that Nietzsche has engaged with Democritean atomism in his early phi-
losophy, notably his lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers. In his middle period writings he does
not take up the philosophy of atomism again and Epicurus is appropriated as an essentially ethical
thinker. See Nietzsche (2001: 120–131) and also Caygill (2006).
 The other three pairs are: Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, and Pascal and Schopenhauer.
On Montaigne’s relation to Epicurean doctrine see Jones (1992: 159–62).
 For insight into this characterisation of Epicurus we encounter in the late Nietzsche, see Choulet
(1998). On decadence, see McCarthy (1994), and Conway (1997), especially chapter two.
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cerns and anxieties he has in his middle period. My contention is that these concerns
and anxieties have not been sufficiently attended to in the literature, so that we fail
to understand the extent to which an ethos of Epicurean enlightenment informs
these texts. Let me list what I see as some of Nietzsche’s principal concerns in his
middle period writings and that serve to inspire him to pursue an Epicurean path:
‒ A critique of commercial society and an emerging consumer culture.
‒ A commitment to stable pleasures and mental equilibrium over the need for con-
stant change.
‒ An attempt to live free of the delusions of human exceptionalism, and free from
the gods, especially the fear of the gods.
‒ An emphasis on a therapy of slowness and the vita contemplativa, including a
tempering of the human mind in order to liberate it from moral and religious fa-
naticism.
‒ The search for a simpler existence purified of the metaphysical need with an at-
tention to the importance of the closest things.
‒ A care of self that is intended to be coextensive with the whole of life, suggesting
an ecological rather than atomistic approach to the art of living.
‒ The need to conquer unjustified fears and to reinstitute the role played by chance
and chance events in the world and in human existence. As Pierre Hadot (1995:
252) notes, for the Epicurean sage the world is the product of chance, not divine
intervention, and this brings with it pleasure and peace of mind, freeing him
from an unreasonable fear of the gods and allowing him to consider each mo-
ment as an unexpected miracle. Each moment of existence can be greeted
with immense gratitude.
‒ In contrast to a teaching on the salvation of the soul Nietzsche favours one that
attends to the needs of the body and that takes the body as its starting-point. A
neglect of the body, for example, through a teaching of pure spirituality, leads
one to self-hatred and produces melancholic individuals.
In his middle period, then, Epicurus is one of Nietzsche’s chief inspirations in his
effort to liberate himself from the metaphysical need and to aid humanity in its
need to now cure its neuroses. Some of the ‘heroic-idyllic’ aspects of Epicurean phi-
losophising are captured in the appreciation we find in Marx’s doctoral dissertation
of 1841. Marx notes, for example, that ‘embodied’ in Epicurus ‘are the serenity of
thought satisfied in itself ’ (Marx 1975: 41, 45). Here Marx is referring to Epicurus’s
subordination of physics to ethics, that is, that the method of explanation ‘aims
only at the ataraxy of self-consciousness, not at knowledge of nature in and for itself ’
(1975: 45). This is also part of Nietzsche’s appreciation of Epicurus in his middle pe-
riod. Epicurus and Nietzsche are both profound liberators of human life from reli-
gious superstition and mystification, and both place ethics at the centre of philoso-
phy. Both are educators and despise the mere erudition of the scholar (see Knight
1933: 437).
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Let me say something about the character of Nietzsche’s thinking in his middle
period.What’s going on in these texts? Is there a core project being developed? There
is and it centres on Nietzsche’s efforts to temper emotional and mental excess. This
concern explains Nietzsche’s commitment to an enlightenment project. The task of
philosophy, as Nietzsche sees it at this time, is to help cool down the human
mind. He writes in 1878:
… shouldn’t we, the more spiritual human beings of an age that is visibly catching fire in more
and more places, have to grasp all available means for quenching and cooling, so that we will
remain at least as steady, harmless, and moderate as we are now, and will thus perhaps become
useful at some point in serving this age as mirror and self-regulation? – (HH I 38)
Epicurean philosophy can play a key role here. Along with science in general, it
serves to make us ‘colder and more sceptical’, helping to cool down ‘the fiery stream
of belief in ultimate definitive truths’, a stream that has grown so turbulent through
Christianity (HH I 244). In The Wanderer and his Shadow Nietzsche describes Epicu-
rus as ‘the soul-soother [Seelen-Beschwichtiger] of later antiquity’ who had the ‘won-
derful insight’ that to quieten our being it is not necessary to have resolved the ulti-
mate and outermost theoretical questions. To those who are tormented by the fear of
the gods, one points out that if the gods exist they do not concern themselves with us
and that it is unnecessary to engage in fruitless disputation over the ultimate ques-
tion as to whether they exist or not. Furthermore, in response to the consideration of
a hypothesis, half belonging to physics and half to ethics, and that may cast gloom
over our spirits, it is wise to refrain from refuting the hypothesis and instead offer a
rival hypothesis, even a multiplicity of hypotheses. To someone who wishes to offer
consolation—for example, to the unfortunate, to ill-doers, to hypochondriacs, and so
on—one can call to mind two pacifying formulae of Epicurus that are capable of
being applied to many questions: ‘firstly, if that is how things are they do not concern
us; secondly, things may be thus but they may also be otherwise’ (WS 7).
In the middle period, Nietzsche turns to Epicurean teaching in a concerted effort
to advance the cause of a renewed enlightenment. However, it’s not an enlighten-
ment in support of a revolutionary transformation of society but one that favours
change through ‘slow cures’ and ‘small doses’ (D 462, D 534). Nietzsche is an admirer
of the critical and rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, of both the eighteenth-cen-
tury version, as we find it in the likes of Voltaire and Lessing, and earlier incarna-
tions, such as we find it in the likes of Epicurus, Petrarch, and Erasmus.⁷ Nietzsche
shares many of the ideas and commitments of the modern Enlightenment, including
the attack on superstition, religious dogmatism, rigid class structures, outmoded
forms of governance and rule, and so on. He does not deny that revolutions can
be a source of vital energy for a humanity that has grown feeble, but he contests
 For insight into the relation between Epicureanism and enlightenment thinking, see the classic
study by Gay (1966). More recently, see Leddy and Lifschitz (2009).
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the idea that it can work as an organiser and perfecter of human nature. He thus ap-
peals to Voltaire over Rousseau, that is, in his eyes to a nature that knows how to
organise, purify, and reconstruct, as opposed to a nature that is full of passionate
follies and half-lies. It is the spirit of revolution that frightens off the spirit of enlight-
enment and of progressive development, and it is this spirit Nietzsche calls upon his
readers to cultivate and nurture. Nietzsche locates in the French Revolution’s ‘histri-
onicism’, a ‘bestial cruelty’, as well as a ‘sentimentality’ and ‘self-intoxication’, and
holds Rousseau responsible for being its intellectual inspiration and for setting the
Enlightenment on ‘its fanatical [fanatische] head’ and with ‘perfidious enthusiasm
[Begeisterung]’ (WS 221). He sees the Enlightenment as being, in fact, alien to the
Revolution, which if it had been left to itself would have ‘passed quietly along like
a gleam in the clouds and for long been content to address itself only to the individ-
ual’ (WS 221).
It is certain that at this time Nietzsche sought to found a philosophical school
modelled on Epicurus’s garden. In a letter of 26 March 1879 he asks his amanuensis
Peter Gast: ‘Where are we going to renew the garden of Epicurus?’ In 306 BC Epicurus
founds his school in Athens, and this remains a presence in the city until the second
century A.D. In contrast to the Stoics who philosophised in the agora of Athens,
never far from the public eye, Epicurus and his followers did philosophy in a garden
which bore the injunction ‘live unnoticed’. Another injunction was ‘do not get in-
volved in political life’ (Clay 2009: 16). The school took the form of a community
of friends who lived within the walls of the garden and worked together, studying
under Epicurus, writing philosophical works, and growing their own food: going
against the mores of the time it was open to both slaves and women. So, the school
was a community based on friendship and friendship was considered by the Epicur-
eans to be the most important thing of all. As one commentator has written:
Members of the school were actively engaged in self-improvement and the improvement of oth-
ers by mutual admonition and correction. The aim was to inculcate goodwill, gratitude, respect
for wisdom, self-control, frankness, openness and moderation in all things. Arrogance, greed,
jealousy, boastfulness, and anger were faults to be removed by gentle correction rather than
by coercion or punishment. (Campbell 2010: 222)
Epicureanism was an apolitical or even anti-political philosophy. The ideal mental
state to attain for the Epicurean is ataraxia (freedom from disturbance, or imperturb-
ability), and to achieve this the philosopher had to withdraw from the disturbances
of everyday life as much as possible, including public affairs, which were seen as a
particular cause of mental disquiet and disturbance. This apolitical, even anti-polit-
ical stance, is reflected in the ethos Nietzsche adopts in his middle period texts. He
writes at one point:
Live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself. Live in ignorance about what seems most im-
portant to your age … the clamor of today, the noise of wars and revolutions should be a mere
murmur for you. You will also wish to help—but only those whose distress you understand en-
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tirely because they share with you one suffering and one hope—your friends—and only in the
manner in which you help yourself. I want to make them bolder, more persevering, simpler,
gayer. (GS 338)
‘Our age’, Nietzsche writes at one point in Dawn, ‘no matter how much it talks and
talks about economy, is a squanderer: it squanders what is most precious, spirit’ (D
179). He succinctly articulates his concern in the following manner: ‘Political and
economic affairs are not worthy of being the enforced concern of society’s most gift-
ed spirits: such a wasteful use of the spirit is at bottom worse than having none at all’
(D 179). Today, he goes on to note, everyone feels obliged to know what is going on
every day to the point of neglecting their own work or therapy and in order to feel
part of things, and ‘the whole arrangement has become a great and ludicrous
piece of insanity’ (D 179). The therapy Nietzsche is proposing in Dawn is, then, direct-
ed at those free spirits who exist on the margin or fringes of society and seek to cul-
tivate or fashion new ways of thinking and feeling, attempting to do this by taking
the time necessary to work through their experiences.
The view that Epicureanism advocates an apolitical posture is in need of some
refinement. It might be suggested that the philosophy of Epicurus offers an alterna-
tive way of organising communities, promoting practices—such as justice, friendship,
and economic co-operation—that are genuinely useful to people’s needs and elimi-
nating all that promotes false conceptions of values and places our happiness in
danger (see Long and Sedley 1987: 137). What is the case, however, is that Nietzsche
appropriates Epicureanism for the end of an ethical reformation. Although he antici-
pates ‘numerous novel experiments’ taking place in ‘ways of life and modes of soci-
ety’ (D 164), his model at this time for the practice of self-cultivation is Epicurus’s
garden.
In 1882 Nietzsche writes in a beautiful aphorism entitled ‘Epicurus’:
Yes, I am proud of the fact that I experience the character of Epicurus quite differently from per-
haps everybody else.Whenever I hear or read of him, I enjoy the happiness of the afternoon of
antiquity. I see his eyes gaze upon a wide, white sea, across rocks at the shore that are bathed in
sunlight, while large and small animals are playing in this light, as secure and calm as the light
and his eyes. Such happiness could be invented only by a man who was suffering continually. It
is the happiness of eyes that have seen the sea of existence become calm, and now they can
never weary of the surface and of the many hues of this tender, shuddering skin of the sea.
Never before has voluptuousness [Wollust] been so modest. (GS 45)
As Monika Langer has recently noted in her interpretation of this aphorism, although
clearly a paean of sorts to Epicurus, Nietzsche does not elaborate on the origin or
nature of his happiness and suffering, but rather tacitly encourages the reader to
consider various possibilities. In the end she argues that Nietzsche is reading Epicu-
rus as a figure who whilst standing securely on firm ground, gazes at the sea and is
able to enjoy the possibility of uncertainty it offers. She writes, ‘Literally and figura-
tively he can float on the sea’ (Langer 2010: 67). Epicurus is depicted as the antithesis
of modernity’s shipwrecked man since such is his liberation and serenity he can
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‘chart his course or simply set sail and let the wind determine his way’ (2010: 67).
Although he might suffer shipwreck and drown or survive he does not live in fear
of dangers and hazards: ‘In taking to the sea he might lose his bearings and even
his mind’ (2010: 67). In contrast to modern man who is keen to leave behind the in-
security of the sea for the safety of dry land, ‘Epicurus delights in the ever present
possibility of leaving that secure land for the perils of the sea’ (Langer 2010: 67).
This interpretation misses the essential insight Nietzsche is developing into Epi-
curus in the aphorism. Rather than suggesting that the sea calls for further and con-
tinued exploration, hiding seductive dangers that Epicurus would not be afraid of,
Nietzsche seems to hold to the view that Epicurus is the seasoned traveller of the
soul who has no desire to travel anymore and for whom the meaning of the sea
has changed. Rather than serving as a means of transportation or something that
beckons us towards other shores, the sea has become an object of contemplation
in the here and now. It is something to be looked at for its own sake and in a way
that discloses its infinite nuances and colours.⁸
Nietzsche champions Epicurus, then, as a figure who has sought to show man-
kind how it can conquer its fears of death. Identifying the goal of a good life with the
removal of mental and physical pain Epicureans place ‘the eradication of the fears of
death at the very heart of their ethical project’ (Warren 2004: 6). As a therapy of an-
guish Epicureanism is a philosophy that aims to procure peace of mind, and an es-
sential task here is to liberate the mind from its irrational fear of death. It seeks to do
this by showing that the soul does not survive the body and that death is not and
cannot be an event within life. There are gaps, potentially significant ones, in
Nietzsche’s appreciation of the Epicurean teaching with regards to death. For exam-
ple, he never subjects to critical analysis the effectiveness of Epicurus’s arguments
but simply assumes that the rediscovery of the certainty of death within modern sci-
ence, along with the demise of the Christian afterlife, is sufficient to eliminate mor-
tality as a source of anguish. But the triumph of the Epicurean view that we are mor-
tal and need not live in fear of an after-life is not necessarily a triumph for the
Epicurean view that we should not fear death: one can eliminate fear of the after-
life by exposing it as a myth, but this does not liberate us from the fear of extinction.
Nietzsche does not make it clear whether he thinks the Epicurean arguments suffice
to console us for the fact of our mortality, though there are places in his corpus where
he appears to be offering new post-religious consolations, such as the consolation we
can gain from the recognition that as experimental free spirits the sacrifices we make
of our lives to knowledge may lead to a more enlightened humanity in the future
(others may prosper where we have not been able to).
What is clear, though, is that Nietzsche is attracted to the Epicurean emphasis on
the modesty of a human existence. Nietzsche admires Epicurus for cultivating a mod-
est existence and in two respects: first, in having ‘spiritual joyfulness [Freudigkeit] in
 Thanks to Beatrice Han-Pile for inspiration here.
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place of frequent indulgence in single pleasures’ (NL 1879, KSA 8, 41[48]), and, sec-
ond, in withdrawing from social ambition and living in a garden as opposed to living
publicly in the market-place (Young 2010: 279). As Nietzsche stresses, ‘A little garden,
figs, little cheeses and in addition three or four good friends—these were the sensual
pleasures of Epicurus’ (WS 192).⁹ Nietzsche is appreciative of what one commentator
has called the ‘refined asceticism’ we find in Epicurus, which consists in the enjoy-
ment of the smallest pleasures and the disposal of a diverse and delicate range of
sensations (Roos 2000: 298).
In this period Epicurus is deployed by Nietzsche as a way of breaking with fanat-
ical enthusiasms and intoxications, including quite possibly Nietzsche’s own early
Dionysian ones. The serene teaching of Epicurus provides Nietzsche with one way
of shedding his previous skin, that of The Birth of Tragedy, and now conducting
the patient labour of self-analysis and self-cultivation as a therapy of body and
soul. Nietzsche finds in Epicurus a victory over pessimism in which death becomes
the last celebration of a life that is constantly embellished (Roos 2000: 299). This last
of the Greek philosophers teaches the joy of living in the midst of a world in decay
and where all moral doctrines preach suffering. As Richard Roos puts it, ‘The exam-
ple of Epicurus teaches that a life filled with pain and renunciation prepares one to
savour the little joys of the everyday better. Relinquishing Dionysian intoxication,
Nietzsche becomes a student of this master of moderate pleasures and careful dos-
ages’ (Roos 2000: 309).
For what ends might we wish to promote an Epicurean Nietzsche today? The
principal end is one of demonstrating that Nietzsche is an enlightenment thinker
seeking the liberation of humanity from its neuroses and unjustified fears and anxi-
eties. In the middle period we encounter a Nietzsche quite different to the legend that
circulates in popular culture and even academic culture. This is a Nietzsche commit-
ted to human emancipation through individual and social enlightenment and exper-
imentation—but a project that stresses the need for slow cures and small doses. In
several respects Nietzsche shares in the appreciation of Epicurus and Epicurean en-
lightenment we find in the young Marx. The main difference, of course, is that Marx
sees the incendiary political effects of Epicurean philosophy, whilst Nietzsche places
the emphasis on a moral—or immoral—avant-garde of free spirits. Nietzsche stresses
that his ‘campaign against morality’ is not a gunpowder campaign; rather, and pro-
vided we have the necessary subtlety in our nostrils, we are to smell in it much sweet-
er scents. Nietzsche sees social change coming about gradually through small-scale
individual experimentation and a free-spirited avant-garde who aim to provide a new
ploughshare of potential universal benefit (D 146). He writes of the need to constitute
ourselves as small, experimental states in which we aim to fashion out of ourselves a
way of being that others will behold with pleasure, providing ‘a lovely, peaceful self-
 Young describes the asceticism advocated by Epicurus as a ‘eudaemonic asceticism’, which is clear-
ly very different to ascetic practices of world denial and self-denial (Young 2010: 279).
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enclosed garden’ and with a gate of hospitality (D 174). In his middle period
Nietzsche is not a political thinker: he is appropriating Epicurus for specific ends,
ones centred on an ethical reformation. By contrast, Marx is locating a revolutionary
potential in Epicurus’s teaching. Although Marx is correct to see in Epicurean doc-
trine a largely ‘contemplative’ materialism and an appeal to a principle of abstract
individuality, he is also correct to locate in it a genuinely revolutionary force, one
that has the potential to radically transform the world and grant the human being
a specifically human form of freedom, entailing liberation from religious fear and su-
perstition. Epicurean philosophy disillusions the world, freeing us from fear of the
gods, and shows us that the world is our friend. However, as Marx recognises, seren-
ity can only be construed an end goal when philosophy has helped to create a world
in which once again it feels at home (Breckman 1999: 270).
16.3 Late Nietzsche
Nietzsche appreciate Epicurus as one of those rare spirits who remain true to the
earth by demythologising nature, embrace human mortality, and accept human
non-exceptionalism. What Nietzsche does seem ambivalent about in the course of
his writings is the kind of ‘happiness’ symbolised by Epicurean delight. Sometimes
he depicts this, as in The Gay Science, as a happiness that is hard-won, conscious of
its precarious character, and inseparable from suffering: the sea of existence has be-
come calm but, as one commentator has put it, ‘its continued calmness cannot be
guaranteed, and the “shuddering skin of the sea” is a constant reminder of the tur-
moil that may return’ (Bett 2005: 63). At other times, especially in his late writings, he
depicts it as a form of tranquillity, a kind of Schopenhauerian release from the tur-
moil of existence and the cravings of the will. When he reads it in these terms it is
viewed as an expression of decadence (A 30). Only in his late writings does Nietzsche
come to express a disquiet over the contemplative aspects of the Epicurean doctrine
on philosophy as a way of life. Nietzsche articulates two mains concerns over Epicur-
ean teaching in his late writings: that its promotion of contemplation as a way of life
amounts to a form of nihilism, or a flight from the realities of existence; and, second,
it is a decadent teaching. Let me look at the critical and clinical point about deca-
dence first.
In The Anti-Christian Epicurus is described as a decadent, indeed, as a ‘typical
decadent’ whose decadence prepares the way for the coming religion of love. (A
30) In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche refers to both Epicureanism and Christianity
as offering a medicine that tranquillises (BGE 200), whilst in the Genealogy he refers
to the super cool but ‘suffering Epicurus’ as one who may have been hypnotised by
the ‘feeling of nothingness’ and the ‘repose of deepest sleep’, that is, the promise of
the absence of suffering (GM III 17). In Epicurus himself, Nietzsche claims, there is a
fear of pain that leads to the religion of love. He thus interprets Epicurus as a phil-
osophical figure whose doctrine conceals an aversion to aspects of reality and an in-
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ability to affirm life at its most terrible and questionable. In The Gay Science we en-
counter a basic contrast between the human being that is richest in the fullness of
life (‘the Dionysian god and human being’) (GS 370), and the one who suffers
most and is poorest in life; the former can afford the sight of the terrible and ques-
tionable as well as the terrible deed and luxury of destruction and negation; the lat-
ter, however, needs first and foremost goodness in thought and deed.¹⁰ Nietzsche
contends that those who are poorest in life are the ones who need mildness and
peacefulness, as well as logic, or the ‘conceptual understandability of existence’
since this gives calm and confidence, providing a ‘warm narrowness that keeps
away fear and encloses one in optimistic horizons’ (GS 370). It is insight into this
type, Nietzsche confides, that enabled him to gradually learn to understand Epicurus,
‘the opposite of a Dionysian pessimist; also the “Christian” who is actually only a
kind of Epicurean …’ (GS 370). The ‘tragic’ is for him essentially what allows for a
greater attachment to life and signifies the affirmation of life beyond good and
evil: it affirms and wants the total economy of life.
Nietzsche further argues contra Epicurus that a doctrine of redemption grows on
the basis of physiological realities; in the case of Epicureanism, which contains a
strong dose of Greek ‘vitality and nerves’, we find a refined development of hedonism
on a morbid foundation. For Nietzsche it is ‘decadent’ to suppose that we can attain
a life of permanent delight and free of the need to grow through the pain of existence
and the stimulus to life such pain gives rise to. As he recognises as early as the first
edition of The Gay Science if one desires to diminish and lower the level of human
pain, one has at the same time to want to diminish and lower the level of our capaci-
ty for joy. Nietzsche is of the view that ‘new galaxies’ of joy are available to us (GS 12).
Let me look, all too briefly, at Nietzsche’s concern over the contemplative life. In
his text The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) Bergson expresses the worry
that there is too much contemplation in philosophy and in particular he locates self-
absorption in both the Epicurean and the Stoic practices of philosophy. Nietzsche ex-
presses the same concern, although he registers his concern in a different style to
Bergson. Consider this note from 1885–86 that runs:
As a great educator, one would have to scourge such a race of ‘blessed people’ mercilessly into
unhappiness. The danger of dwarfing, of relaxation is present at once: —against Spinozistic or
Epicurean happiness and against all relaxation in contemplative states. (NL 1885, KSA 12, 1
[123] = WP 911)¹¹
 See also the modified version of this aphorism in Nietzsche contra Wagner, ‘We Antipodes’.
 With regards to Spinoza Nietzsche no doubt has in mind here his intellectual love of God which
he describes in GS 372 as ‘bloodless’. However, I would argue that this misses the chief innovation of
Spinoza’s love. Although one can see what Nietzsche means (since it is a highly intellectual love), it
seems to me to miss the significance of what Spinoza has done with respect to God: when we know
God adequately and properly, that is, as a substance of immanence and completely de-anthropo-
morphised, we experience joy for Spinoza. The more we know of nature/God and of ourselves as a
part of nature, the more we feel empowered and thus experience joy. This joy in our own power is
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My view is that in his later writings Nietzsche is expressing a particular concern over
contemplation as a way of life and as the telos of life. For him to set as the goal of life
the attainment of a state of perfected beatitude is to fall prey to nihilism and a neg-
ation of life.We, however, need to ask the question: is this the right way to view Ep-
icurus’s teaching?
Nietzsche’s criticism of Epicurus, especially his claim that he is a decadent, in-
deed a ‘typical’ one, seems to miss the aim of his teaching on pleasure, namely, and
as James Porter so instructively brings out, that being more than a principle of simple
happiness the state of serenity or cheerfulness operates as a formal principle of life,
shaping a life that is lived and enjoyed. According to the teaching of Epicurus the
practice of virtue entails experiencing a precious attachment to the world and an in-
sight into—from our point of view—into its highest reality. In part, this is what
Nietzsche captures in his beautiful paean to the name ‘Epicurus’ in The Gay Science:
kind of ‘happiness’ attained by the true Epicurean is precarious but also the most
profound and it gains its richness from the fact that it is born of suffering. Virtue
is not so much ‘power’ for Epicurus, but more a way of being in the world. We see
this in Nietzsche’s depiction of Epicurus in GS 45. The scene he depicts for us is
one of Epicurean illumination or enlightenment: Epicurus is not estranged from na-
ture and recognises his kinship with animals and the elements of nature. Rather than
deploying his contemplation of the sea to bolster his own ego (thinking of his own
safety or taking pride in fearlessness), Epicurus abandons his sense of self altogether
so that he can open himself up to the sea of existence, and perhaps here we find an
alternative to Dionysian ecstasy, entailing a more peaceful and less grandiose loss of
the self into the Ur-Eine (see BT 1, 4, 5, 6, 22). Unlike Christ, Epicurus does not walk
on the water but floats serenely on the sea, buoyed up by it and even cradled by it,
happy with the gifts life has to offer, and existing beyond fear and anxiety even
though he is opening himself up to troubling realities, such as the approach of
death and his personal extinction. As Epicurus reminds us in ‘Vatican Sayings’ 14:
‘We are born once and cannot be born twice, but we must be no more for all time.’
related to God (to an understanding of the world) and yields a free and unselfish love, one that is
neither grasping nor insecure. As Spinoza says, we don’t expect to be loved by God in return: strictly
speaking, God neither loves nor hates anything (Ethics Book V, P 17). Moreover, as the highest good
that follows from the dictate of reason, and as something common to all human beings, this love can-
not be stained either by envy or by jealousy (P 20). Contrast this with the idea of God found in the
Judeo-Christian tradition: God as divine judge in which the believer has the needy desire to be loved
by God and is jealous if others are loved more. Here one is lead to fear the divine wrath, to disdain the
adherents of other sects, and to construct elaborate rituals to appease the wrath of God and secure
his favour. For Spinoza all of this is superstitious nonsense: the thought of God should be a source of
strength and joy, not anxiety, fear, envy, and jealousy. It is this conception of God that Spinoza over-
turns in his idea of the intellectual love of God: rather than being bloodless, it comes from genuine
(rational, scientific) knowledge and an extra-human joy (because we have transcended the level of
mere animal need and desire, including a fixation on our own self-perpetuation and narrow perspec-
tives). See Cook (2007: 136– 137).
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Perhaps it is best to locate in Nietzsche’s ‘Epicurus’ what one commentator has
described as an ambivalent decadence (Shearin 2014: 72). On the one hand, Nietzsche
construes Epicurus as the inventor of the heroic-idyllic style of philosophising and,
on the other hand, describes him as a typical decadent who suffered from a fear of
pain. Whatever we make of Nietzsche’s final ambivalence towards Epicurus and his
legacy, it is clear that in his middle period writings he is profoundly inspired by his
teaching and example: he makes inventive use of it so as to mount what we can call
an ethics of resistance, an ethics that works contra the normalising and disciplinary
logic of modernity and what Nietzsche calls in Dawn our ‘stressed, power-thirsty’ so-
cieties (D 271). Although certainly not read by Nietzsche as providing a revolutionary
doctrine, Epicurean teaching contains for him invaluable resources for a substantial
ethical reformation.
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